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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

LIFE SCIENCES DUAL USE RESEARCH OF CONCERN, PUBLIC
HEALTH AND SAFETY, AND THE DOCTRINE OF
UNCONSTITUTIONAL CONDITIONS
VICKIE J. WILLIAMS*
I. INTRODUCTION
Legitimate scientific research, if misused or misapplied, can pose a
possible or real threat to public health, our conceptions of morality, or even
life as we know it. The existence of such “dual use research of concern”
(DURC)1 poses difficult legal questions regarding the appropriate balance
between competing interests in public safety and freedom of expression,
including questions about the advisability of using the law as the tool to
balance these interests.
Recently, such difficult questions were presented by life sciences DURC
when two teams of government-funded researchers succeeded in
transforming the usually difficult-to-transmit avian influenza virus into an
airborne virus easily transmissible between mammals.2 The scientists
reported the results of their experiments to the National Institute of Allergy
and Infectious Diseases (NIAID), the public agency that funded the
experiments, and also sought to publish the results in mainstream, well-

* Associate Professor of Law, Gonzaga University School of Law, Spokane, Washington. The
author would like to thank Professor Rob Gatter and the St. Louis University Center for Health
Law Studies for the opportunity to present her work at the 25th Annual St. Louis University
Health Law Symposium on Regulating Dual Use Research in Life Sciences. She would also like
to thank Gonzaga University School of Law students Morgan Dyrek and Joseph Cahall for
their research assistance, and Gonzaga University School of Law for financial support for this
research.
1. Dual Use Research of Concern in the context of the life sciences is defined as
“research that, based on current understanding, can be reasonably anticipated to provide
knowledge, information, products, or technologies that could be directly misapplied to pose a
significant threat with broad potential consequences to public health and safety, agricultural
crops and other plants, animals, the environment, materiel, or national security.” See OFF.
SCI. & TECH. POLICY, UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT POLICY FOR INSTITUTIONAL OVERSIGHT OF LIFE
SCIENCES DUAL USE RESEARCH OF CONCERN 2 (2013) available at http://www.phe.gov/s3/dual
use/Documents/oversight-durc.pdf.
2. Martin Enserink, Controversial Studies Give a Deadly Flu Virus Wings, 334 SCIENCE
1192, 1192 (2011).
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respected scientific journals.3 NIAID requested that the National Science
Advisory Board for Biodefense (NSABB) review the manuscripts to determine
whether publication might trigger national security concerns.4 Initially, after
reviewing the manuscripts, the NSABB recommended redacting them to
remove the methodology and details that could enable replication of the
experiments.5 Much of the scientific community argued that compliance with
this request would eviscerate the nature of scientific experimentation, which
requires that results of experiments be replicable by others in order to allow
the continued growth of scientific knowledge.6 Therefore, the NSABB’s
request generated a major controversy within the scientific and legal
communities. This request illustrated the difficulty of reconciling the needs
and culture of the scientific community for openness and collaboration to
advance science, with the needs and culture of the government for secrecy
to ensure national security when DURC is produced.
Ultimately, the NSABB reversed its position, and the two papers were
published without incident (to date).7 Nevertheless, the difficulty of balancing
the government’s power to control and direct the course of scientific
research to protect the public from harm, with the needs of scientists for
freedom to experiment and communicate their results in the name of
science, remains unresolved. The federal government funds a large portion
of the scientific and life sciences research done in the U.S.8 The tool it
traditionally uses for controlling scientific research is to place contractual
limitations on how such research is conducted, and/or how and to whom it
is communicated.9 However, such government-imposed limitations on
conducting scientific research, or publishing the results of the research, may
impinge on the scientists’ First Amendment rights of free expression, thus
triggering legal review under the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions.

3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Oversight Hearing on Biological Security: The Risk of Dual-Use Research: Hearing
Before the U.S. S. Comm’n on Homeland Sec. & Gov’t Affairs, 112th Cong. 8 (2012)
[hereinafter The Risk of Dual-Use Research] (Testimony of Anthony S. Fauci, M.D., Director,
Nat’l Inst. of Allergy & Infectious Diseases).
6. See Enserink, supra note 2, at 1193. See, e.g., Victoria Stodden, The Scientific
Method in Practice: Reproducibility in the Computational Sciences 3 (MIT Sloan School
Working Paper No. 4773-10, 2010), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1550193.
7. Brendan Maher, Bird-Flu Research: The Biosecurity Oversight, 485 NATURE 431, 434
(2012).
8. NATIONAL SCIENCE BOARD, NSB 12-01, SCIENCE AND ENGINEERING INDICATORS 2012,
4-13 (2012), available at http://www.nsf.gov/statistics/seind12/pdf/c04.pdf.
9. See Steve Keane, The Case Against Blanket First Amendment Protection of Scientific
Research: Articulating a More Limited Scope of Protection, 59 STAN. L. REV. 505, 514-15
(2006).
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The unconstitutional conditions doctrine is the principle that states the
government cannot require a person to forego a constitutional right in order
to receive a government-conferred benefit.10 Often, the right at issue in
unconstitutional conditions cases is the right of free speech or freedom of
the press under the First Amendment. Although the U.S. Supreme Court has
decided numerous cases involving assertions of the doctrine of
unconstitutional conditions by those seeking a government benefit, its
jurisprudence in this area has been inconsistent. It has not spoken on the
doctrine’s application to scientific research, and its pronouncements provide
conflicting clues as to how it would apply the doctrine to government
attempts to control DURC through conditions on funding of research or
publication of research results.
This article explores the application of the doctrine of unconstitutional
conditions as it applies to DURC, particularly in the area of life sciences
research. Part II briefly reviews the jurisprudence of the doctrine of
unconstitutional conditions, and then focuses on how the courts have
applied the doctrine in cases where the government imposes restrictions on
recipients of federal funds that implicate their First Amendment rights of free
expression. This would be the most common posture in which a case
involving DURC would arise. Part III reviews the federal government’s
current policy regarding funding and communication of life sciences DURC,
ongoing efforts to refine and implement the policy, and whether the current
policy is likely to be found to violate the doctrine of unconstitutional
conditions. Part IV suggests that rather than ban or classify life sciences
DURC, the government can carefully craft restrictions to define the limits on
government-funded research that allow life sciences DURC to be conducted
and communicated while minimizing the risk of violating the doctrine of
unconstitutional conditions and preserving the scientific method. Such an
approach is more likely to protect us than the use of more draconian
methods of ensuring secrecy. This approach will not endanger our place
amongst the global community of life sciences and international public
health experts, but will ensure that we continue to have a place at the table
while keeping a watchful eye on the work that is being done.
II. THE DOCTRINE OF UNCONSTITUTIONAL CONDITIONS
AND GOVERNMENT FUNDING
The doctrine of unconstitutional conditions is implicated when the
government seeks a quid pro quo that limits the exercise of a person’s

10. Regan v. Taxation with Representation of Washington, 461 U.S. 540, 545 (1983)
(citing Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972)).
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constitutional rights in exchange for a government benefit.11 The doctrine
has been asserted in connection with a wide variety of government benefits.
Receipt of tax deductions,12 tax-exempt status,13 government employment,14
direct funding for participation in a government program,15 government
funding to assist in carrying out one’s core, non-governmental functions,16
and funding to participate in a government-created limited public forum17
have all been deemed to be government benefits that trigger scrutiny under
the doctrine. The doctrine is implicated both by conditions on government
benefits that compel speech18 and by conditions that require the recipient to
refrain from speaking.19 Generally, the doctrine prevents the government
from doing indirectly, through the withholding of a benefit, what it could not
do directly through regulatory or statutory command.20 The doctrine applies
even when the government has no obligation to offer the benefits in the first
place.21
Although the government has “wide latitude to set spending priorities,”
the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions clearly applies when the
government acts under its Spending Clause authority as a disburser of
federal funds or a subsidizer of private activities.22 Although the usual way
for a party to object to a condition placed on the receipt of federal funds is
to decline the funds, a party cannot be forced to choose between exercising
its constitutional rights under the First Amendment and receiving a
government benefit or subsidy.23 In particular, the government cannot use
the provision or refusal to provide a benefit in order to suppress ideas that it
deems “dangerous.”24 And when the government does place conditions on
funding that implicate the recipient’s First Amendment rights, they need to

11. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1664 (9th ed. 2009).
12. Speiser v. Randall, Assessor of Contra Cnty., Cal., 357 U.S. 513, 529 (1958).
13. Regan, 461 U.S. at 545.
14. Perry, 408 U.S. at 597.
15. See Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 198-99 (1991); Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez,
531 U.S. 533, 533, 548 (2001).
16. See Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n v. League of Women Voters of Cal., 468 U.S. 364,
378 (1984); Nat’l Endowment for the Arts et al. v. Finley et al., 524 U.S. 569, 587 (1998);
United States v. Am. Library Ass’n, Inc. 539 U.S. 194, 211 (2003); Agency for Int’l Dev. v.
Alliance for Open Soc’y Int’l, Inc., No. 12-10, slip op. at 12 (June 20, 2013).
17. See Rosenberger et al. v. Rector of the Univ. of Va. et al., 515 U.S. 819, 829 (1995).
18. See Agency for Int’l Dev., No. 12-10, slip op. at 12.
19. See Legal Servs. Corp., 531 U.S. at 544.
20. See Perry, 408 U.S. at 597.
21. See Agency for Int’l Dev., No. 12-10, slip op. at 8.
22. Finley, 524 U.S. at 588. See Agency for Int’l Dev., No. 12-10, slip op. at 8.
23. See Finley, 524 U.S. at 587. See Agency for Int’l Dev., No. 12-10, slip op. at 7-8.
24. See Regan v. Taxation with Representation of Washington, 461 U.S. 540, 550
(1983).
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be precisely targeted at the dangers that may exist to justify the abridgment
of the right to free expression.25
The context of the speech that is sought to be restricted is also relevant
to determine whether a condition placed on government funding is
unconstitutional. Restrictions that are placed on areas that have been
traditionally public forums for expressive activity are particularly suspect, as
are restrictions that attempt to leverage government funding to regulate
private speech that the speaker undertakes outside of the contours of the
government-funded program.26
There are a number of complicating factors and uncertainties that make
it difficult to determine whether a condition put on government funding is
likely to pass constitutional muster. Disagreement amongst members of the
Supreme Court about how to characterize or weigh these factors has led to
a large number of closely split decisions regarding the application of the
doctrine of unconstitutional conditions to government funding.27 Therefore,
it is extremely difficult to predict whether any specific condition will pass
muster. Many, if not all, of these complicating factors and uncertainties are
present when the subject of the government funding is life sciences DURC.
Thus, as will be discussed in Part III, any effort by the government to
articulate an effective and legally sustainable approach to controlling DURC
is likely to be difficult, complex, and may need to be undertaken on a caseby-case basis.
Nevertheless, we can draw some guidance from the case law regarding
what kinds of restrictions on life sciences DURC the courts will look upon
favorably and unfavorably. One factor that the Court has considered
significant is whether or not the expressive activity that was sought to be
prohibited or restricted can be segregated from other, non-government
funded activities that a grant recipient undertakes.28 Generally, when a
restriction is limited to a grant recipient’s work in the government-funded
program, leaving the recipient free to speak on the restricted topic in other
contexts, the restriction will be upheld (provided it is not otherwise
objectionable).29 For example, in Rust v. Sullivan, a provision of a statute
25. See Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n v. League of Women Voters of Cal., 468 U.S. 364,
380 (1984).
26. See Agency for Int’l Dev., No. 12-10, slip op. at 11; Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173,
197-99 (1991); Bd. of Trs. of Stanford Univ. v. Sullivan, 773 F.Supp. 472, 476-77 (D.D.C.
1991).
27. See, e.g., United States v. Am. Library Ass’n, Inc. 539 U.S. 194, 197 (2003) (sixjustice plurality, with three dissenters); Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 533
(2001) (five-four decision); Rust, 500 U.S. at 173 (five-four decision); Fed. Commc’ns
Comm’n, 468 U.S. at 354 (five-four decision).
28. See Rust, 500 U.S. at 197.
29. Id. at 199.
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was upheld that prevented recipients of government funding for family
planning services from counseling clients about abortions or referring clients
for abortions.30 The restriction was upheld because it was couched in terms
of a prohibition on the government-funded project, rather than a prohibition
aimed at the recipient of the government funds.31
In its most recent term, the Court reiterated this distinction between
conditions on speech that are confined to the actual government spending
program being funded, and conditions that seek to regulate speech outside
of the boundaries of the government program itself.32 The former were cited
with approval, while the Court struck down as unconstitutional a
requirement that a recipient of federal funds affirmatively espouse a point of
view that was not limited to its work within the scope of the governmentfunded program.33
Yet, even in making this distinction, the Court has not been entirely
consistent. For example, consistent with this policy, in Federal
Communications Commission v. League of Women Voters, the Court struck
down a prohibition on editorializing by noncommercial educational
broadcasting stations who received grants from the Corporation for Public
Broadcasting (CPB), noting that even a station that received only one
percent of its overall income from the CPB would be barred from all
editorializing.34 The Court reasoned that such a station could not segregate
its activities according to the source of its funding.35 Further, in Legal
Services Corporation v. Carmen Velazquez, the Court struck down a
requirement that legal services providers funded by the Legal Services
Corporation (LSC), which distributes federal funds to grantees who provide
legal services to low-income and indigent clients, refrain from trying to
amend or challenge then-existing welfare laws.36 The prohibition in
Velazquez was interpreted to apply not only to cases or clients that were
funded by the LSC, but also to any work by a recipient of LSC funds,
regardless of whether or not she was acting on behalf of a LSC-funded

30. Id. at 177-78.
31. Id. at 196-97.
32. See Agency for Int’l Dev., No. 12-10, slip op. at 8.
33. Id. at 12. The requirement at issue was that a group or organization accepting the
federal funds have “a policy explicitly opposing prostitution and sex trafficking.” Id. at 1.
34. Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n, 468 U.S. at 365.
35. Id. at 400. The Court contrasted this situation with the situation presented by a nonprofit §501(c)(3) organization prohibited from lobbying by tax-exemption law, but that could
establish a separate §501(c)(4) affiliate to pursue its lobbying efforts, without forfeiting its taxexempt status. Id. It then stated that the educational broadcasting station could not segregate
its activities according to the source of its funding in the same manner, although it did not say
why that would not be possible. Id.
36. Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 547-48 (2001).
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client.37 In striking down this restriction, the Court did not specifically state
that the funding condition was unconstitutional because it attempted to
restrict speech outside of the context of the federally funded program;
rather, it focused on its belief that there would likely be no alternative source
for a client to receive the type of advocacy that the government sought to
restrict.38
This was unlike the situation approved in Rust, where, according to the
Court, the client seeking family planning services was not required to forego
the government-funded services in order to receive abortion counseling
through an alternative channel.39 The Court did not explicitly state that the
application of the restriction on speech to both the government-funded
program and to the privately funded activities in Velazquez. Nevertheless,
the blanket prohibition on advocating for amendment or change of welfare
statutes by LSC funding recipients is the functional equivalent of the
leveraging prohibition seen in other cases just viewed from the perspective
of the services recipients, rather than from the perspective of the funding
recipients.40
First Amendment restrictions on the receipt of government funds have
been upheld in some cases where the government-funded program cannot
be segregated from privately funded programs. In United States v. American
Library Association, Inc., the Court upheld a requirement that libraries
receiving funds under two programs designed to help the libraries must
provide internet access to patrons and install software to block access to
pornographic images.41 Although the libraries could not determine whether
a particular patron’s internet use was being funded by the federal programs
or by other funds, and the purposes of the two federally funded programs
could not be segregated from the general purposes of a public library, the
Court, in a plurality opinion, upheld the software requirement against a
challenge that it was an unconstitutional condition.42 Rather than focusing
on the non-segregable nature of the government-funded and non-

37. Id. at 538.
38. Id. at 535.
39. Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 214 (1991). See also Velazquez, 531 U.S. at 54647.
40. See Velazquez, 531 U.S. at 547-48.
41. United States v. Am. Library Ass’n, Inc. 539 U.S. 194, 199 (2003).
42. Id. at 199, 208. The two federal programs at issue were the E-rate program, 47
U.S.C. §254(h)(1)(B), and the Library Services and Technology Act (LSTA), 20 U.S.C. §9101 et
seq. Id. at 201-02. The purpose of the E-rate program was “[to] help open new worlds of
knowledge, learning, and education to all Americans . . .” Id. at 212. The purpose of the
LSTA was “to stimulate excellence and promote access to learning and information resources
in all types of libraries for individuals of all ages.” Id. Clearly, these purposes are
indistinguishable from the mission of a public library, regardless of the source of funding.
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government-funded activity and the activity funded by other sources, the
Court’s plurality characterized the software requirement as a permissible
condition to ensure that the “public funds be spent for the purposes for
which they were authorized.”43
Characterizing a restriction on protected speech or expression, as a
means of ensuring that public funds be spent for the purposes for which they
were authorized by the government, has also been used to justify restrictions
surrounding applications for competitive government funding –– a context
that is most directly applicable to a potential restriction on National Institutes
of Health (NIH) or National Science Foundation (NSF) funding for life
sciences DURC. The difficulty in such cases is ensuring that the restriction is
specific enough to achieve its goals without seeming to target only ideas
that are deemed “dangerous” by the government.44 A funding restriction
that is clearly content-based and prevents an otherwise qualified proponent
with a seemingly “dangerous” idea from competing for funding would be a
clear-cut example of an unconstitutional condition on government
funding.45 Such a restriction would likely be deemed to cross the line from a
definition of purpose “into a penalty on disfavored views,” designed to have
a coercive effect and chill expression that the government deems
undesirable.46
In the context of competitive funding, as illustrated in National
Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, there is difficulty in distinguishing between
permissible funding criteria that are designed to ensure that public funds are
used for their intended purpose, and impermissible content-based
restrictions on expression of “dangerous” ideas.47 In Finley, Congress
responded to a public outcry about government funding for art, which many
believed to be provocative and unworthy of government support, by
amending the statutes that established criteria by which the National
Endowment for the Arts (NEA) chose projects to fund.48 The amended statute
required the NEA to “tak[e] into consideration general standards of decency
and respect for the diverse beliefs and values of the American public.”49

43. Id. at 211-12.
44. See Nat’l Endowment for the Arts et al. v. Finley et al., 524 U.S. 569, 585 (1998).
45. Id. at 587 (citing Regan v. Taxation with Representation of Washington, 461 U.S.
540, 550 (1983)).
46. Id. at 587.
47. Id. at 583-86.
48. Id. at 574-75.
49. National Endowment for the Arts, 20 U.S.C. § 954(d)(1) (2011). The provocative
works of art that prompted the amendment of the statute were a retrospective of photographer
Robert Mapplethorpe’s work, which included homoerotic photographs, and a photograph by
Andres Serrano entitled “Piss Christ,” which consisted of a crucifix immersed in urine. Finley,
524 U.S. at 574.
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Four performance artists who had been recommended by a panel to be
approved for NEA grants prior to the amendment of the statute, but were
subsequently denied funding, challenged the amended statute.50 They
claimed that the provision requiring the NEA to consider “general standards
of decency” violated their First Amendment rights by injecting viewpointbased restrictions into government funding that was protected speech.51
Although the Court did not explicitly discuss the doctrine of
unconstitutional conditions, it drew heavily on prior cases that applied the
doctrine to strike down government restrictions on expressive conduct.52 It
ultimately distinguished those cases from the case at bar and upheld the
statute.53 The Court noted that in the context of funding for the arts, unlike in
many other contexts, the government does not encourage a diversity of
views and is mandated to make aesthetic judgments.54 Because the
challenge to the statute was facial, not as-applied, the case was
distinguishable from a hypothetical case where the NEA used its power to
invoke a penalty on disfavored viewpoints, which the Court said would be
prohibited even in a government subsidy situation.55 The Court drew a clear
distinction between situations where the government is acting as a patron by
awarding competitive funding, and those where the government is directly
regulating speech, stating that “Congress has wide latitude to set spending
priorities” in the context of awarding competitive funding, whereas it has
more limited power to directly regulate or criminalize speech.56 The Court

50. Finley, 524 U.S. at 577.
51. Id. at 577-78. They also claimed that the NEA had “failed to follow proper statutory
procedures . . . had breached the confidentiality of their grant applications,” and that the
provision in question was void for vagueness. Id. at 577. An additional amendment to the
statute, requiring all grantees to certify in writing that they would not use federal funding to
create projects that could be considered obscene and did not have “serious literary, artistic,
political, or scientific value,” was invalidated previously as unconstitutionally vague by a
federal district court. Dep’t. of the Interior & Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 103 Stat.
738-42 (1990). See also Finley, 524 U.S. at 575.
52. Finley, 524 U.S. at 621 (citing Massachusetts v. Oakes, 491 U.S. 576, 584 (1989)).
53. Id. at 586.
54. Id. Thus, the case was distinguishable from cases where the government creates a
limited public forum, and then denies access to the forum by certain disfavored groups. See
Rosenberger et al. v. Rector of the Univ. of Va. et al., 515 U.S. 819, 834 (1995).
55. Finley, 524 U.S. at 586-87.
56. Id. at 587-88. A concurrence by Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Thomas, suggested
even further deference to Congress is warranted in the context of competitive funding. Id. at
590. The concurrence states that content and viewpoint-based criteria are constitutional
grounds upon which to evaluate grant applications. Id. Justices Scalia and Thomas noted that
they regard the distinction between abridging speech and funding it as a “fundamental
divide,” and that the First Amendment is inapplicable to funding decisions. Id. at 599.
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reasoned that without such latitude, the government would be unable to
sponsor any competitive funding programs.57
The Court in Finley also acknowledged the importance of the context in
which the speech is regulated when determining whether a condition
imposed on the receipt of government funds is constitutional.58 In areas that
have traditionally been open to free expression “or have been expressly
dedicated” to free speech, the government’s ability to control speech within
that forum is subject to greater scrutiny, even when the restriction is limited
to speech within a government-funded project.59 According to the Court,
[T]he university is a traditional sphere of free expression so fundamental to
the functioning of our society that the Government’s ability to control speech
within that sphere by means of conditions attached to the expenditure of
Government funds is restricted by the vagueness and overbreadth doctrines
of the First Amendment.60

Because the majority of life sciences DURC is done in the university setting
(including the avian influenza DURC that sparked the most recent
controversy over publishing restrictions), judicial pronouncements regarding
attempts to use research funding to restrict expressive conduct in the
university setting are particularly applicable to determining what restrictions
on DURC will pass constitutional muster.
There is little case law addressing restrictions on research funding in the
university setting.61 Nevertheless, in one case squarely on point, the NIH
included a confidentiality clause in a grant for research into the
development of an artificial heart.62 The confidentiality clause required
researchers “to obtain government approval before publishing or otherwise
57. See id. at 587-88.
58. See id. at 590-91.
59. See Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 200 (1991) (citing United States v. Kokinda, 497
U.S. 720, 726 (1990)).
60. Rust, 500 U.S. at 200. See also Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 836 (discussing the
importance of the university setting as “the center of our intellectual and philosophic
tradition.”).
61. There is, however, a fair amount of legal commentary on the subject of whether
scientific research is entitled to any kind of First Amendment protection, and if so, the
appropriate scope of such protection. See, e.g., Steve Keane, supra note 9, at 505; Barry P.
McDonald, Government Regulation or Other “Abridgements” of Scientific Research: The
Proper Scope of Judicial Review Under the First Amendment, 54 EMORY L. J. 979 (2005).
However, all agree that expression carried out in the course of performing scientific research,
and communication of the results of scientific research are entitled to First Amendment
protection. For purposes of this article, I presume that protected communication about
scientific research is not segregable from the research itself. Therefore, the doctrine of
unconstitutional conditions is triggered at all stages of the research.
62. Bd. of Trs. of the Leland Stanford Junior Univ. v. Sullivan, 773 F. Supp. 472, 473
(D.D.C. 1991).
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publicly discussing preliminary research results.”63 Stanford University
submitted a proposal to do the research but objected to the confidentiality
clause.64 When the government and Stanford could not agree on the clause,
the contract was awarded to a different university. Stanford sued the
government claiming the clause was “an illegal prior restraint on speech
and an unconstitutional condition on a government benefit.”65
First, the Stanford court noted that the restriction failed the segregability
test of Rust v. Sullivan.66 Under the confidentiality clause, the Stanford
researchers could not speak about the artificial heart research outside of the
context of the government-funded research program.67 In addition, the
Stanford court noted that the subject of the lawsuit, a restriction on speech
at a university, was “the very free expression that the Rust Court held to be
so important to the functioning of American society . . . .”68 Taking a strong
position in favor of academic freedom, the Stanford court said:
Stanford University, a premier academic institution, engaged in significant
scientific and medical research for the benefit of the American people, is not
ipso facto compelled under the law to surrender its free speech rights and
those of its scientific researchers to a ‘contracting officer’ merely because a
regulation issued by defendants so directs. There exists, after all, the First
Amendment to the Constitution, the supreme law of the land, which protects
those very rights.69

The Stanford court concluded that the confidentiality clause, when
applied to the university setting, was an unenforceable, unconstitutional
condition.70 The court ordered that the contract, without the confidentiality
clause, be awarded to Stanford University.71

63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 473-74.
66. Id. at 476.
67. Bd. of Trs. of the Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 773 F.Supp. at 476.
68. Id. at 477.
69. Id. at 478.
70. Id. at 479. The Stanford court was also less than convinced that any harm would flow
from publication of the preliminary research results concerning the artificial heart. The
government’s purported reason for the confidentiality clause was to protect the public health
and safety by protecting prospective patients from “unwarranted hope.” Id. at 477 n.16. The
Stanford court called this “a strange and attenuated way of protecting health and safety.” Id. A
court considering a similar confidentiality clause concerning DURC might be less skeptical
about the government’s claims of public harm that would result from premature or
unauthorized publication of the results, and more inclined to defer to the government’s request
to block disclosure. See, e.g., United States v. Progressive, Inc., 467 F. Supp. 990, 996 (W.D.
Wis. 1979) (in a case where the United States sought an injunction against a magazine
seeking to publish details about how to build an atomic bomb, the judge, while
acknowledging the government’s heavy burden of proof to suppress publication, noted that
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When deciding whether such a restriction or prohibition of speech is
constitutional, the courts have also considered the practical effect that tying
government funding to restricting free expression is likely to have on the
overall exercise of First Amendment rights in American society.72 The
Stanford court recognized that very few sizable undertakings in the modern
world are not supported in some manner by government funds.73 It
reasoned that if the government’s position regarding the confidentiality
clause was accepted as law, it would present an “enormous threat” to First
Amendment rights, and indeed, to a “free society.”74
Often, the governmental funding agency occupies a dominant role in
the financing of the contemplated endeavor.75 In such cases, receiving the
government funding is like an “imprimatur” that acts as a proxy for merit
and value.76 When the selection criteria for government funding from a
government agency that is dominant in the field are viewpoint-based, they
have a chilling effect on the exercise of First Amendment rights outside of
the context of the government-funded project.77 Furthermore, when it is
customary for private donors to match government funds awarded under
competitive grants, the chilling effect of the funding restriction is
magnified.78 In the context of funding for scientific research, including

“[a] mistake in ruling against the United States could pave the way for thermonuclear
annihilation for us all. In that event, our right to life is extinguished and the right to publish
becomes moot.” The judge issued the injunction.). See also, L. A. Powe, Jr., The H-Bomb
Injunction, 61 U. COLO. L. REV. 55 (1990).
71. Bd. of Trs. of the Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 773 F. Supp. at 479.
72. Id. at 478.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. See, e.g., Nat’l Endowment for the Arts et al. v. Finley et al., 524 U.S. 569, 621-22
(1998) (Souter, J., dissenting); Rosenberger et al. v. Rector of the Univ. of Va. et al., 515 U.S.
819, 835 (1995). The recent case of Nat’l Fed. of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566
(2012), adds an interesting wrinkle to the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions when the
recipient of federal funds is a state institution. In NFIB, the Supreme Court held, for the first
time, that the conditions placed on an offer of federal money under a Spending Clause
program (Medicaid) amounted to inappropriate “coercion” of the states, and could not be
enforced. Id. at 2603-04. Central to the Court’s reasoning on this point was the extremely
large portions of state budgets that are comprised of federal Medicaid funds. Id. at 2604-05.
If funds for DURC are offered to a state institution, such as a state university, with onerous
restrictions on the right of free expression, and the funds are vital to the continuation of the
university’s research mission, under NFIB, it is possible that a court could consider the
conditional funding an offer the state cannot refuse, and could strike the conditions down as
overly coercive.
76. Finley, 524 U.S. at 622 (Souter, J., dissenting), (quoting Bella Lewitzky Dance Found.
v. Frohnmayer, 754 F. Supp. 774, 783 (C.D. Cal. 1991)).
77. See Finley, 524 U.S. at 622 (Souter, J., dissenting).
78. Id.
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DURC, competitive grant-based funding from the NIH, NSF, or other
government agencies may occupy the role of primary funding source.79
Thus, any restriction placed on the conduct or publication of DURC has the
potential to chill scientific research beyond the context of governmentfunded research, as well as within government-funded projects.80 Preventing
this effect requires that restrictions be carefully considered, as they may
adversely affect the ability of an applicant to advance her research agenda
outside of, as well as within the scope of, the government-funded project.
In the context of life sciences DURC, all of the factors that the Court has
considered significant when distinguishing between unconstitutional
conditions and permissible restrictions on funding of government projects
are present. The research usually takes place in a traditionally open forum,
such as a university.81 The government funding agencies are dominant in
the market for funding, and the government’s pronouncements on the
fundability of the research are often taken as statements about the merit of
the proposal.82 Government and private funds are often mixed together to
fund a single project, and the availability of private funds may also depend
on whether the project is publicly funded.83 Because of the large number of
factors that affect the constitutionality of restrictions placed on government
funding, and the even larger number of combinations of these factors that
might attach to any particular offer of funding, it is extremely important that
any restrictions placed on the conduct or publication of government-funded
DURC be narrowly tailored to protect the public or the country’s national
security in a manner that places the least amount of restrictions on
constitutionally protected expression.84

79. See OFF. SCI. & TECH. POLICY, supra note 1, at 14.
80. The federal government appears to recognize this chilling potential. In the proposed
United States Government Policy for Institutional Oversight of Life Sciences Dual Use Research
of Concern, the government notes that “designating research as DURC should not be seen as
a negative categorization . . . As a general matter, designation of research as DURC does not
mean that the research should not be conducted or communicated.” Id. at 3.
81. See Keane, supra note 9, at 532.
82. See id.
83. See id.
84. The question of whether scientific research of any kind is protected by the First
Amendment is unresolved. See, e.g., id. at 523 (arguing that scientific research is protected by
the First Amendment in only limited circumstances, when it constitutes “expressive” conduct);
McDonald, supra note 61, at 986 (arguing that there is no First Amendment right of scientific
research per se, but restraints on such research could trigger incidental restrictions on
expression that is protected under the First Amendment); Cass. R. Sunstein, Is There a
Constitutional Right to Clone?, 53 HAST. L. J. 987, 1003 (2002) (stating that the jurisprudence
in the area is “ill-developed”). A discussion of whether scientific research is protected by the
First Amendment is beyond the scope of this article. It is generally agreed that communication
of research results or discussion of research (non-classified) is expression protected by the First

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

94

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY JOURNAL OF HEALTH LAW & POLICY

[Vol. 7:81

III. CURRENT GOVERNMENT EFFORTS TO RESTRICT OR CONTROL EXPRESSIVE
CONDUCT IN LIFE SCIENCES DURC
Concerns about the wisdom and public safety surrounding life sciences
DURC is not new.85 Nevertheless, the anthrax attacks of 2001, which
followed closely on the heels of the terrorist attacks on September 11th
(9/11), heightened awareness about life sciences DURC and its potential to
endanger public health and safety and added some urgency to the debate
about controlling the flow of such information.86 After the anthrax attacks,
some scientific professional societies and the editors of major journals in the
life sciences considered instituting policies restricting publication of
information on DURC that could pose national security risks, but ultimately
rejected such an approach in favor of self-regulation.87 This was not
surprising. Unlike other areas of scientific research which have a history and
culture of secrecy and cooperation with the national security community, life
sciences researchers have no such established culture.88
A.

The Fink Report and the National Science Advisory Board for Biodefense

The federal government recognized the tensions between minimizing or
eliminating the potential threats to national security and public health threats
by life sciences DURC with the legitimate needs of life sciences researchers
to communicate research in sufficient detail to permit peer review for validity
and reproducibility in order to advance biomedical and life sciences
research.89 Therefore, in 2003, “the [National Academy of Science] (NAS)
appointed a committee to propose a framework that could be used to
minimize national security and public health threats posed by [life sciences]
DURC without undermining biomedical research and science.”90 The
committee produced a comprehensive report in 2004, popularly known as

Amendment. See Miller v. Cal., 413 U.S. 15, 22-23 (1973); Bd. of Trs. of the Leland Stanford
Junior Univ., 773 F. Supp. 472, 477; Keane, supra note 9, at 520-23. This article focuses on
attempts to restrict the expressive conduct involved in both the production and publication of
life sciences DURC.
85. See Vickie J. Williams, The “Jurassic Park” Problem—Dual-Use Research of Concern,
Privately Funded Research and Protecting Public Health, 53 JURIMETRICS 361, 363-66 (2013)
(summarizing historical efforts to control communication and publication of DURC).
86. Id. at 366.
87. COMM. ON RESEARCH STANDARDS & PRACTICES TO PREVENT THE DESTRUCTIVE APPLICATION
OF BIOTECHNOLOGY, NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, BIOTECHNOLOGY RESEARCH IN AN AGE OF
TERRORISM 97 (2004) [hereinafter FINK REPORT], available at http://www.nap.edu/catalog/10
827.html.
88. Id. at 85.
89. Williams, supra note 85, at 366.
90. Id. at 367; Ruth R. Faden & Ruth A. Karron, The Obligation to Prevent the Next DualUse Controversy, 335 SCI. 802, 802-03 (2012).
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the Fink Report (named after committee chair, Professor Gerald R. Fink, of
the Massachusetts Institute of Technology), which suggested a multiplepronged approach to national safety and life sciences DURC.91 Although
the Fink Report made recommendations regarding the education of
scientists concerning the risks of DURC, training methods for personnel
involved in DURC, and physical containment of potentially dangerous
pathogens, it did not recommend expansion of the use of the classified or
top secret designations for such research.92 The committee was very
concerned about the risk of a “chilling effect” that such designations would
have on life sciences research, and the danger that such an effect would
pose to continued progress in the areas of life sciences research and public
health.93 The committee endorsed a “softer” approach, recommending
creation of the NSABB, a body of experts that would act as a liaison
between the government and the life sciences community to facilitate
oversight and review of DURC.94
The federal government followed the committee’s recommendations and
established the NSABB.95 The NSABB consists of a broad spectrum of
experts including, “scientists, lawyers, infectious disease experts, scientific
editors, and public health experts.”96 The avian influenza experiments,
discussed in Part I, were the first time that the NSABB recommended that
scientific manuscripts be redacted to exclude experiment methodology and
details to prevent replication of the experiments prior to publication.97
Although the authors and the journal editors agreed to consider the
recommendation, it was on the condition that the government would allow
restricted circulation of the complete manuscripts to those with a legitimate
need for the information.98 While the issue was being discussed, the World
Health Organization weighed in with its opinion, concluding that publication

91.
92.
93.
94.
95.

FINK REPORT, supra note 87, at 111-26.
Id. at 118.
Id.
Id. at 110-11.
NAT’L SCI. ADVISORY BD. ON BIOSECURITY, ENHANCING RESPONSIBLE SCIENCE
CONSIDERATIONS FOR THE DEVELOPMENT AND DISSEMINATION OF CODES OF CONDUCT FOR DUAL
USE RESEARCH, 1, 30 (2012), available at http://oba.od.nih.gov/oba/biosecurity/documents/
COMBINED_Codes_PDFs.pdf.
96. See The Risk of Dual-Use Research, supra note 5, at 12 (testimony of Dr. Paul S.
Keim, Acting Chairman, National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity).
97. Id. at 6 (testimony of Anthony S. Fauci, M.D., Director, National Institute of Allergy
and Infectious Diseases).
98. Statement by Dr. Bruce Alberts, Editor-in-Chief, Sci., Regarding Publication of H5N1
Avian Influenza Research (Dec, 20, 2011), http://www.aaas.org/news/releases/2011/media/
1220herfst_statement.pdf).
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of the full manuscripts was preferable from a public health perspective.99
One of the scientist-authors, Dr. Yoshihiro Kawaoka, Ph.D., advocated
publicly for wide dissemination of the research so that researchers from
other areas could contribute to the vital field of influenza research.100
Ultimately, after reviewing additional data and the revised manuscripts, the
NSABB withdrew its recommendation for redaction and the manuscripts
were published in full.101
B.

The United States Government Policy for Oversight of Life Sciences Dual
Use Research of Concern

Current U.S. policy regarding the funding and control of DURC
contemplates close cooperation and partnerships between the NSABB,
private researchers, and the funding agencies, as suggested by the Fink
Report. This approach is reflected in the official guidance documents and
pronouncements that the government has produced since the controversial
avian influenza experiments.
While the avian influenza controversy continued to percolate without a
resolution, the U.S. issued its Policy for Oversight of Life Sciences Dual Use
Research of Concern (Dual Use Policy).102 The Dual Use Policy is designed
to address existing, unclassified, ongoing research that has already been
funded, as well as research that has been previously proposed but is
pending a funding decision.103 It is specifically limited to work with one of
15 identified biological agents and toxins (including avian influenza

99. The Risk of Dual-Use Research, supra note 5, at 8-9 (2012) (statement of Anthony
Fauci, Director, National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases), available at
http://www.hsgac.senate.gov/download/2012-04-26-fauci-testimony-biological-security.
100. Yoshihiro Kawaoka, Flu Transmission Work is Urgent, 482 NATURE 155, 155 (2012).
101. The influenza research community also initiated a voluntary moratorium on avian
influenza research, that lasted for approximately one year. The Risk of Dual-Use Research,
supra note 5, at 7; Denise Grady, Research to Resume on Modified, Deadlier Bird Flu, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 24, 2013, at A8. The United States released new guidelines for such research on
Feb. 22, 2013, thus allowing such research to resume in the United States, or elsewhere with
American funding. See DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., A FRAMEWORK FOR GUIDING U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES FUNDING DECISIONS ABOUT RESEARCH PROPOSALS
WITH THE POTENTIAL FOR GENERATING HIGHLY PATHOGENIC AVIAN INFLUENZA H5N1 VIRUSES THAT
ARE TRANSMISSIBLE AMONG MAMMALS BY RESPIRATORY DROPLETS, available at https://www.phe.
gov/s3/dualuse/Documents/funding-hpai-h5n1.pdf (last visited Aug. 5, 2013) [hereinafter
FRAMEWORK].
102. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT POLICY FOR OVERSIGHT
OF LIFE SCIENCES DUAL USE RESEARCH OF CONCERN, 1 (2012), available at http://oba.od.nih.
gov/oba/biosecurity/PDF/United_States_Government_Policy_for_Oversight_of_DURC_FINAL
_version_032812.pdf.
103. Id. at 3.
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virus).104 It is also limited to seven categories of experiments that utilize these
agents, which are considered to be most likely to produce DURC.105 Its main
proposed method for controlling expressive conduct in the context of life
sciences DURC is through the development of a risk mitigation plan with
cooperation between the federal funding agency and the institution or
researcher.106 This plan can include “[d]etermining the venue and mode of
communication (addressing content, timing, and possibly the extent of
distribution of the information) to communicate the research responsibly.”107
If such measures prove inadequate to mitigate the risks posed by the
research, the federal funding agency may request voluntary redaction of
communications or publication, may classify the research, or may terminate
or refuse to provide research funding.108
Experts in life sciences research and public health who are reviewing the
Dual Use Policy have pointed out many of the problems with this approach
because it can lead to uncertainty about the constitutionality of any actions
taken under the Policy that restrict communications regarding the research
or its results.109 They point out that the lack of uniform standards or
guidelines among funding agencies with regard to what constitutes risk
could pose “significant security and compliance challenges for institutions
receiving funding from more than one government agency,” perhaps
foreshadowing a challenge to a restriction based on the inability to
segregate the restricted research from non-restricted research, or based on
competing restrictions.110 They have also pointed out that the Dual Use
Policy does not provide research institutions or agencies with sufficient
guidance on how to minimize the risk that misuse could occur once results,
methods, or information generated by the research are communicated.111

104. Id at 2.
105. Id. at 2-3.
106. Id. at 3.
107. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., supra note 102, at 3.
108. Id. at 3-4.
109. See American Association for the Advancement of Science, Report of a Meeting on
“Bridging Science and Security for Biological Research: A Discussion about Dual Use Review
and Oversight at Research Institutions” held at AAAS headquarters in Washington D.C. 13-14
Sept. 2012, http://www.aaas.org/cstsp/programs/bridging-science.shtml [hereinafter Bridging
Science].
110. Id.
111. Id. at 22. See also Leslie Gielow Jacobs, A Troubling Equation in Contracts for
Government Funded Scientific Research: “Sensitive But Unclassified” = Secret But
Unconstitutional, 1 J. NAT’L SECURITY L. & POL’Y 113, 141 (2005) (arguing that the
government’s expanded use of the designation “sensitive but unclassified” for scientific
information and research since 9/11 is unconstitutional because of imprecise definitions,
requirements of enforcement by prepublication review, and lack of a sufficient link between
the information and a clear national security danger).
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This may be an indication that it will be extremely difficult, if not impossible,
to narrowly tailor any restriction to mitigate the specific harm contemplated,
a constitutional requirement for restrictions of speech, absent a complete
moratorium on publication or communication, for example, classifying the
research.112
To the extent that the Dual Use Policy applies to research that has
already been undertaken, attempts to block publication or otherwise control
communications after the funding has already been awarded would be akin
to a government agency that agreed to fund a project in the arts and then,
upon reviewing the resulting work of art either while in progress or upon
completion, imposed a new criterion tailored to that project so that it could
not be shown to its intended audience. Whereas in National Endowment for
the Arts, the Court upheld subjective criteria on funding of arts projects that
could be considered viewpoint-based or content-specific as part of a
competitive funding process.113 It would have been quite a different case if
the National Endowment for the Arts (NEA) had funded the projects, viewed
the completed work, and then deemed it unacceptable for public viewing.114
The experts also noted that overly restrictive policies are likely to have a
chilling effect on research that falls under the Dual Use Policy, with
concomitant negative effects on biodefense preparedness, health and
agriculture, and increased vulnerability to biological threats.115 They also
recognized the incompatibility of redacting scientific publications to remove
information that supports the quality and reproducibility of the research in
question with the very nature of the scientific endeavor and academic
freedom.116 The experts discussed the reality that scientific research is
communicated to various audiences through various venues throughout the
lifetime of a research project, and how that reality is incompatible with
attempts to censor, redact, or embargo results and methods, particularly in
an era of instantaneous communication through the Internet and social
media.117 The report discussed that DURC can emerge from work that is not

112. See Jacobs, supra note 111, at 142-44.
113. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 587.
114. Id. at 571.
115. Bridging Science, supra note 109, at 22.
116. Id. at 23.
117. Id. The experts have also discussed the problems surrounding life sciences DURC in
the international arena, which poses additional challenges to controlling DURC from misuse.
See American Association for the Advancement of Science, Proceedings from the Meeting on
“Bridging Science and Security for Biological Research: International Science and Security”
held at AAAS headquarters in Washington D.C. 4-5 Feb. 2013, http://www.aaas.org/cstsp/
files/International-Science-and-Security-AAAS-AAU-APLU-FBI_2013.pdf. A discussion of the
international implications of trying to control DURC is beyond the scope of this article, but the
control of the spread of information about DURC internationally may trigger regulations
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related to work with the select agents that are subject to the Dual Use
Policy.118 Finally, the report noted that expansion of the government’s review
of scientific research for DURC that is outside of the scope of the Dual Use
Policy’s 15 select agents might be prudent.119
C. A Framework for Guiding U.S. Department of Health and Human
Services Funding Decisions with Regard to Avian Influenza H5N1
Research Proposals
The first indication of how the U.S. will make future funding decisions for
projects that implicate life sciences DURC since the avian influenza
experiments appeared in guidelines recently issued by the U.S. Department
of Health and Human Services (HHS).120 The guidelines were published as A
Framework for Guiding U.S. Department of Health and Human Services
Funding Decisions about Research Proposals with the Potential for
Generating Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza H5N1 Viruses that are
Transmissible among Mammals by Respiratory Droplets121 (Framework), and
is designed to “ensure a robust review of research proposals prior to making
a funding decision,” taking into consideration all risks and benefits of the
proposal.122 Among the criteria the funding agency will use to determine
funding are whether the research information is intended to be broadly
shared in order to “realize its potential benefits to global health,” and
whether the research “will be supported through funding mechanisms that
facilitate appropriate oversight of the conduct and communication of the
research.”123 The complete funding agency consideration process is
reproduced below:124

regarding export controls. Indeed, the avian influenza researchers had to receive permission
under export control regulations to publish their papers. See Bridging Science, supra note
109, at 10.
118. Bridging Science, supra note 109, at 24.
119. Id.
120. See FRAMEWORK, supra note 101, at 2.
121. See id.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 5.
124. Id. at 4.
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With regard to controlling communication of DURC, the Framework
does very little to address the concerns regarding vagueness that were
raised by the experts reviewing the Dual Use Policy. Instead, the funding
criteria contains a vague statement that the funding mechanism must
facilitate “appropriate oversight” of the communication of research, and
explicitly states that HHS must consider each proposal on a case-by-case
basis.125
The Framework also contemplates a departmental-level review to
“consider proposals in the context of the entire HHS research portfolio” of
avian influenza research.126 At this level, HHS can determine whether the
risks associated with the project are unjustified in light of other, similar

125. FRAMEWORK, supra note 101, at 3, 5.
126. Id. at 7.
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research that HHS or other federal agencies currently support with
funding.127 If the department-level review determines that the proposal is
unacceptable for HHS funding, the proposal is deemed ineligible for
funding agency support.128 The Framework does not contain any appeal
mechanism for applicants denied funding outside of HHS.129
D. U.S. Government Policy for Institutional Oversight of Life Sciences Dual
Use Research of Concern
In order to enlist the cooperation and expertise of the institutions that
actually conduct life sciences DURC, and perhaps to respond to some of the
criticisms regarding the vagueness of the restrictions on communication and
publication of DURC contained in the Dual Use Policy, the U.S. published
the proposed Policy for Institutional Oversight of Life Sciences Dual Use
Research of Concern (Institutional Oversight Policy) in February 2013.130
Unfortunately, the Institutional Oversight Policy raises more constitutional
questions than it answers.
The Institutional Oversight Policy takes a holistic approach to life
sciences DURC. Rather than view methodologies, products, technologies, or
publication as separate steps in the process that are subject to separate
criteria and controls, the Institutional Oversight Policy considers the entire
course of research as a whole product.131 This closely reflects the reality of
how scientific research is conducted and communicated. The Institutional
Oversight Policy includes an acknowledgement of the importance of “free
and open conduct and communication of life sciences research” to the
scientific enterprise and encourages continuation of such conduct and
communication as a goal of both the government and the institutions
engaged in the research.132 The Institutional Oversight Policy sets forth an
organizational framework for the institutional oversight process that places
joint responsibility for reviewing projects that could implicate life sciences
DURC on the principal investigator, the institution receiving federal funding,
and the funding agency.133 This process is set forth below:134

127. Id.
128. Id.
129. See id. (explaining that if applicants are denied, they may “resubmit their proposal
during a future grant cycle).
130. United States Government Policy for Institutional Oversight of Life Sciences Dual Use
Research of Concern, 78 Fed. Reg. 12369-70 (Feb. 22, 2013).
131. See OFF. SCI. & TECH. POLICY, supra note 1, at 3.
132. Id. at 5.
133. Id. at 8-9.
134. Id. at 9.
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In addition, the Institutional Oversight Policy makes it clear that it is the
responsibility of the principal investigators is “to communicate DURC in a
responsible manner” while affirming that such communication “is an
essential activity that occurs throughout the research process,” not just at the
point of publication.135
Perhaps the most interesting part of the Institutional Oversight Policy,
from the standpoint of the constitutional implications of restrictions that
might be included in a funding decision, or a risk mitigation plan that is
required by the government in order to receive funding, is the application of
the policy to “[i]nstitutions within the United States that receive federal funds
to conduct or sponsor life sciences research, and conduct or sponsor
research that is within the scope identified in Section 6.2, regardless of
source of funding.”136 The government’s justification for this broad
application of the policy is that it “promotes more meaningful oversight of
DURC at the institutional level and fosters uniform approaches to the

135. Id. at 9-10.
136. Id. at 6. The policy also applies to foreign institutions “that receive federal funds to
conduct or sponsor research” that is covered under the scope of the policy. Id.
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responsible conduct and communication of all research that may raise
DURC concerns at an institution.”137
Through this broad application of this policy, the government is placing
a condition on the recipient of federal funds, not just on the project that is
being federally funded. The U.S. Supreme Court has recently said that this
type of leveraging of a restriction on a government spending program to
apply to privately funded speech is impermissible, even when the restriction
is relevant to the objectives of the federal program.138 Even though this
scope of restriction may be practical, in light of the fact that it is common for
research money from both public and private sources to be pooled together
to fund a single project, it squarely implicates the unconstitutional conditions
doctrine as it has been applied in such pooling situations in the past.139
The obligation to engage in monitoring and risk mitigation continues
beyond the initial funding stage. Failure to comply with the Institutional
Oversight Policy may result in termination of federal funding or loss of future
federal funding opportunities.140 Therefore, it is “an ongoing condition on
researchers’ speech and activities,” rather than solely a funding selection
criterion.141 The Supreme Court has held that restrictions on federal funding
that go beyond selection criteria must be scrutinized closely to determine
their true purpose.142 Even in light of the case for ongoing review and
monitoring of DURC, the government has a compelling purpose to require
projects to be related to the scope of federally funded projects, but it is less

137. United States Government Policy for Institutional Oversight of Life Sciences Dual Use
Research of Concern, supra note 114, at 12372.
138. See Agency for Int’l Dev. v. Alliance for Open Soc’y Int’l, Inc., No. 12-10, slip op. at
8 (June 20, 2013) (“the relevant distinction that has emerged from our cases is between
conditions that define the limits of the government spending program — those that specify the
activities Congress wants to subsidize — and conditions that seek to leverage funding to
regulate speech outside the contours of the program itself.”). See also Bd. of Trs. of Stanford
Univ. v. Sullivan, 773 F.Supp. 472, 476 (D.D.C. 1991) (explaining that the Court in Rust
made a distinction between an individual’s denial for benefits due to his own speech and the
use of the public funds for the purposes intended.).
139. See, e.g., Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n v. League of Women Voters of Cal., 468 U.S.
364, 399-401 (1984) (explaining that because restricted government funds could not be
segregated from private funds being used for the same project, the restriction constituted
impermissible leveraging of the federal funding to regulate private speech outside of the scope
of the federally funded program). United States Government Policy for Institutional Oversight
of Life Sciences Dual Use Research of Concern, 78 Fed. Reg. 12369-72 (Feb. 22, 2013).
140. OFF. SCI. & TECH. POLICY, supra note 1, at 6.
141. Agency for Int’l Dev., No. 12-10, slip op. at 12.
142. See Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 193, 196 (1991) (The challenged regulations
were simply “designed to ensure that the limits of the federal program are observed,” and
“that public funds [are] spent for the purposes for which they were authorized.”).
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clear whether it can use its authority as leverage to monitor what is being
done in privately funded programs.143
E.

Additional Legal Complications in Protecting Government-Funded
Materials

It is difficult to walk the fine line between protecting DURC from misuse
by crafting precise, viewpoint-neutral funding conditions that are limited to
the scope of the actual federal program being funded, and those overbroad
prior restraints on speech and expression that are likely to suppress ideas
that the government considers “dangerous” and have an unacceptable
chilling effect on protected speech, even without any additional
complicating factors. This would be true even in the absence of any
additional complicating factors. The availability to the public of tools like the
Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) and state open records laws, which can
be used to access risk assessments of DURC that could provide enough
information to facilitate misuse of DURC, makes it even more difficult to
control DURC in order to prevent misuse.144 The culture of openness of
public records is not only limited to FOIA and state open records laws. On
the same day that the federal government issued the Institutional Oversight
Policy for comment, it also issued a policy “direct[ing] each Federal
agenc[ies] with over $100 million in annual . . . research and development
expenditures to develop a plan to support increased public access to the
results of research funded by the Federal Government.”145 Although
national security should be considered when developing such a plan, the
policy of the Obama administration is clearly turned towards greater
transparency of federally funded materials as compared to some prior
administrations; thus, complicating the efforts the administration is making
to protect DURC from misuse.146
IV. PROTECTING GOVERNMENT FUNDED DURC FROM MISUSE WHILE PRESERVING
FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION IN SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH
Inevitably, there are trade-offs between open dialogue and national
security when we consider whether and how to restrict communication of
DURC. This is true whether we are talking about communication between
researchers within the contours of a particular project, communication of
143. Bd. of Trs. of Stanford Univ., 773 F. Supp. at 475.
144. See Bridging Science, supra note 109, at 24.
145. Memorandum from John P. Holdren, Dir., to Heads of Exec. Dep’ts and Agencies 2
(Feb. 22, 2013).
146. See id. at 2-3; Jacobs, supra note 111, at 120 (discussing differences between the
Clinton and Bush administrations in how they treat responses to FOIA requests for information
that might be considered sensitive with regard to homeland security).
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research results in an academic setting, or formal publication of research in
peer-reviewed journals. In today’s world of nearly instantaneous
communication via the Internet, WikiLeaks, and Twitter, any action to restrict
communication of DURC, even formal classification of research, is bound to
be imperfect.147 Furthermore, classification of life sciences DURC will have
an inevitable chilling effect on researchers’ willingness to engage in such
research.148 Because life sciences DURC is by its very nature an international
endeavor, all that a high degree of secrecy is likely to accomplish is a
relocation of this important work to locations outside of the U.S. and a turn
towards private funding sources where the government will have virtually no
control over the research nor any ability to use its results to react to a public
health or national security threat presented by DURC.149 In addition, with
regard to naturally occurring pathogens such as the avian influenza virus,
the U.S. is heavily dependent on cooperation from other countries to supply
American researchers with samples of the pathogens. If the research results
could not be shared between these governments and the foreign researchers
that are supplying the pathogens for the research, it is most likely that
foreign entities will stop supplying the U.S. with such pathogens. Secrecy is
also anathema to the scientific endeavor and the nature of life sciences
research, which has always relied on the free inflow and outflow of
information and results to build upon prior work and to serve the greater
good.150
Life sciences DURC presents a perfect storm for the application of the
doctrine of unconstitutional conditions in the context of government funding.
Virtually every factor that the courts have said must be considered when
applying the doctrine and do complicate the analysis in the typical life
sciences DURC case. These factors include the following: it typically takes
place in a traditional forum for the free and open exchange of ideas,
restrictions placed on communications tend to be vague and imprecise

147. Even classified information can be leaked or transmitted to those who might seek to
misuse it to our detriment. Consider the current case of Edward Snowden, the National
Security Agency contractor accused of leaking top-secret, classified information about a
government surveillance program to Wikileaks. See, e.g., Jim Heintz, Edward Snowden Has
Entered Russia, Lawyer Says, THE HUFFINGTON POST, Sept. 4, 2013, http://www.huffington
post.com/2013/08/01/edward-snowden-russia_n_3688225.html.
148. See Bridging Science, supra note 109, at 22 (stating that there has already been a
chilling effect on scientists researching with select agents because of “overly restrictive
policies”).
149. With regard to privately funded DURC within the United States, it is likely that any
such research is being conducted for ultimate commercial gain. Williams, supra note 85, at
374. Therefore, it may be possible to control the conduct and communication of such
research through the use of the patent law. Id.
150. See McDonald, supra note 61, at 1021.
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because of the uncertainty of the results of the research, there is a serious
need for international cooperation and openness in order to conduct the
research, and government-funded research is usually not segregable from
privately funded research.151 It is also virtually impossible to restrict only the
program, rather than a recipient of the funding because of the nature of the
scientific endeavor. On the other hand, the risk of harm if life sciences
DURC is misused could not be greater, as it could threaten the very survival
of the human species. Given the high stakes involved, what is the best
course for us to take?
Prior case law suggests that considering potential danger of misuse at
the point of making a funding decision for a competitive grant is more likely
to pass constitutional muster than attempts to restrict communication of
information once the research is underway.152 Therefore, including an
assessment for the potential for a proposed project to produce DURC and
its misuse in funding criteria for a grant, and then using the results of the
assessment in making a funding decision is the preferred methodology for
controlling misuse. From a practical standpoint, it will be virtually impossible
to restrict communications that take place between researchers while they
carry out the research, although background checks and guidelines for
communications carried out while actually working on the governmentfunded projects are certainly available and desirable.
Restrictions on DURC imposed at the funding stage are much more
likely to be characterized as a permissible means of ensuring that
government funds are used for their intended purpose than as a prohibited
unconstitutional condition on a government benefit.153 The difficulty that the
government will face is in appropriately characterizing conditions on the
receipt of the funds in a manner that is constitutionally acceptable and
sufficiently specific. Risk mitigation plans that require research results to be
subject to government pre-publication review or be redacted prior to
publication in a peer-reviewed journal would most likely be considered
classic prior restraints. Prior restraints are the most disfavored type of
restraint on speech, permitted “only in exceptional cases.”154 In addition,
attempts to censor or block publication based on a pre-publication review
by the funding agency will, by necessity, be content-based rather than
content-neutral. Thus, they would most likely trigger a heightened level of
scrutiny by a court to ensure that the restriction is narrowly tailored to avert
the feared danger and that there is no better or less restrictive way to

151. See Keane, supra note 9, at 520, 532; See McDonald, supra note 61, at 1022.
152. Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 193, 198 (1991).
153. Id. at 198.
154. Bd. of Trs. of Stanford Univ. v. Sullivan, 773 F.Supp. 472, 474 (D.D.C. 1991)
(quoting Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 716 (1931).
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achieve the same purpose.155 The government would be required to explain
the danger in some detail and to convince a court that it had a “compelling
interest” in preventing publication of the material.156 This need to explain the
danger, in and of itself, could provide more information to those who would
seek to misuse DURC than the government is comfortable revealing.157
Therefore, the government is left with three basic approaches to
controlling DURC without triggering the doctrine of unconstitutional
conditions. The first approach is to not conduct the DURC at all or ban
certain types of experiments or procedures that are most likely to produce
DURC that could be misused. This is a choice that governments make when
proposed research presents a clear moral dilemma and a less clear physical
danger, such as proposals for certain stem cell research or certain types of
cloning.158 This approach is likely to be constitutionally sound, but may put
the U.S. at a disadvantage as compared to other nations that are less
concerned about DURC or have fewer legal protections on speech and
expression.159 In addition, most life sciences DURC consists of basic
research, rather than applied research.160 Basic research, which is not
directed towards producing a specific product or addressing a specific need,
is more likely to lead to broad-reaching discoveries that can then be used in
applied research to develop solutions to specific problems.161 A ban on
basic research could hobble American scientific and engineering innovation,
putting the U.S. at a competitive disadvantage for years to come.
The second approach that the government could take is to classify all
DURC and criminalize the unauthorized communication of DURC. This is

155. See McDonald, supra note 61, at 1025-27.
156. Id. at 1013-14.
157. Id. at 1025. Although the government could request an in camera examination of
evidence, or request that the record be sealed, the more people who have knowledge of the
potentially dangerous information, the more likely it is that the information will be leaked or
inadvertently revealed.
158. See, e.g., Keane, supra note 9, at 516-18; McDonald, supra note 61, at 1018,
1024.
159. Brazil, China, India, South Korea, and Singapore are among the many countries
expanding their biological research capacity and workforce. NATIONAL SCIENCE FOUNDATION,
SCIENCE AND ENGINEERING INDICATORS O-7, O-8 (2012), available at http://www.nsf.gov/sta
tistics/seind12/figures_tn1.htm (last visited August 5, 2013).
160. Basic research is defined as “systematic study directed toward fuller knowledge or
understanding of the fundamental aspects of phenomena and of observable facts without
specific applications towards processes or products in mind.” Applied research is defined as
“systematic study to gain knowledge or understanding necessary to determine the means by
which a recognized and specific need may be met.” NATIONAL SCIENCE FOUNDATION, OFFICE
OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET CIRCULAR A-11, available at http://www.nsf.gov/statistics/rand
def/fedgov.cfm (last visited August 5, 2013).
161. Id.
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the approach that the government has taken with atomic energy research
and nuclear weapons development.162 This would require a sea change in
the culture of life sciences research, which has traditionally been carried out
by researchers in academic institutions with a goal of open flow of inputs
and outputs, publication, and broad dissemination of results.163 Although
this approach is likely to be constitutionally acceptable, we are likely to lose
a whole generation of research and researchers while those who are
uncomfortable with, unwilling, or unable to work in a classified environment
leave the industry and new personnel are trained. Furthermore, while the
government’s position is that wide dissemination of information concerning
nuclear weapons research is not in the public interest or in the interest of
national security,164 its position regarding dissemination of life sciences
research that could constitute DURC is far less clear. Life sciences DURC
can be used to better the public health on an international scale, and broad
dissemination of the results of DURC, if not misused, may enhance national
security if they are used to stop a pandemic or to produce a vaccine that
can be used worldwide. Although classification of life sciences DURC would
minimize the likelihood that DURC will be misused, it is not the preferred
method of controlling misuse.
Finally, the government can continue to fund DURC through competitive
grant making and can use funding conditions to “ensure that th[ose] funds
are properly applied to the prescribed use.”165 However, merely calling a
condition on grant funding a definition of the program will not necessarily
insulate the condition from a challenge to its constitutionality.166 The courts
will look to its overall effect, beyond the label placed on the condition by the
government.167 A condition that reaches beyond the federally funded project
and restricts what the grantee can do or say when working on other projects
is likely to be invalidated.168 Likewise, conditions that restrict the grantee’s

162. See id. at 1022.
163. See id. at 1022-23 (explaining that “a researcher desiring . . . information . . . would
be barred from acquiring it without government authorization, even from another researcher
who would have been willing to share it absent such restrictions.”).
164. See id. at 1023.
165. Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 195, n.4 (1991). These funding conditions can be
combined with current restrictions on the availability of dangerous materials and greater
scrutiny of those who work with such materials to ensure greater national security. See
CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION: OFFICE OF PUBLIC HEALTH PREPAREDNESS AND
RESPONSE, CDC SELECT AGENT PROGRAM (2008), available at http://www.cdc.gov/phpr/docu
ments/DSAT_brochure_July2011.pdf.
166. Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 547 (2001).
167. See Agency for Int’l Dev. v. Alliance for Open Soc’y Int’l, Inc., No. 12-10, slip op. at
8, 11 (June 20, 2013).
168. See id. at 12.
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work or communications on projects where federal funds are mixed with
private funds restrict recipients, not programs, and are likely to be
susceptible to a constitutional challenge.169 Therefore, a restriction placed
on communications of DURC that is part of a risk mitigation plan put in
place to comply with the current draft of the Institutional Oversight Policy is
likely to be vulnerable to constitutional challenge,170 because the current
draft of the policy places oversight requirements on non-federally funded
research as a condition of receiving federal funds.171
Beyond these broad guidelines, when it comes to distinguishing
“between conditions that define a federal program and those that reach
outside it,”172 we will have to review specific risk mitigation plans on a caseby-case basis to determine the constitutionality of the plan.
V. CONCLUSION
Life sciences DURC presents unparalleled opportunities for
enhancements to public health and national security, as well as unparalleled
possibilities for national and global disaster. Trying to ensure that we reap
the benefits of such research without unleashing catastrophe also presents
difficult challenges to preservation of our fundamental freedoms of
expression. In a global environment, conducting all such research in secret
or banning the conduct of life sciences DURC is not wise or practical, and
might actually produce the bad effect that we would be trying to avoid.
Because the government is a major financial sponsor of life sciences
DURC, one would assume that the government can control the conduct and
dissemination of such research. But the doctrine of unconstitutional
conditions limits what restrictions the government can place on protected
expressive conduct, especially when the government’s intent is to suppress
ideas that can be dangerous. Although the government is permitted to place
conditions on research that define the scope of the funded project, it is not
permitted to leverage those restrictions to control speech or expression
outside of the scope of the project. In the context of science and scientific
communication, it is particularly difficult to segregate conduct that takes
place within the scope of the federally funded project from conduct that is

169. See Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n v. League of Women Voters of Cal., 468 U.S. 364,
400 (1984); Rust, 500 U.S. at 180 (noting that the federally funded program subject to the
restriction on speech was required by regulation to be “physically and financially separate”
from other projects that engaged in the prohibited activities).
170. See OFF. SCI. & TECH. POLICY, supra note 1, at 10.
171. See id. at 12.
172. “Definition more precise must abide the wisdom of the future.” Agency for Int’l Dev.,
No. 12-10, slip op. at 11 (quoting Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 591
(1937)).
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outside of the scope of the project. The very nature of the scientific
endeavor, academic freedom, and the culture of life sciences research work
against the ability to make such distinctions.
Therefore, a mix of voluntary policing by the scientific community,
coupled with carefully crafted definitions that limit the scope of federally
funded life sciences research that is likely to produce DURC, is the more
appropriate means of protection. This is the course that the government is
currently on and should continue to pursue. Project scope definitions should
avoid outright restrictions on publication or communication of research to
avoid triggering the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions. Limits placed on
each funded project should be reviewed on a case-by-case basis to ensure
that the government is not seeking to leverage its funding to regulate
expression outside of the contours of the funded program itself.
History tells us that:
Every major technology — metallurgy, explosives, internal combustion,
aviation, electronics, nuclear energy — has been intensively exploited, not
only for peaceful purposes but also for hostile ones. Must this also happen
with biotechnology, certain to be the dominant technology of the coming
[21st] century?173

As government policy on life sciences DURC continues to evolve with the
science, experts will need to continue their vigilance to protect public health,
national security, and our fundamental freedoms, even when these interests
seem on first glance to be mutually incompatible. This work will not be easy,
but it is vitally important to preserving a robust scientific community, our
fundamental freedoms of expression, and our health, national, and personal
security.

173. BRIDGING SCIENCE AND SECURITY FOR BIOLOGICAL RESEARCH, INTERNATIONAL SCIENCE
SECURITY 5 (Feb. 4-5 2013), available at http://www.aaas.org/cstsp/files/InternationalScience-and-Security-AAAS-AAU-APLU-FBI_2013.pdf (quoting Matthew Meselson).
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